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THE MORAL READING ALL DOWN THE LINE
JAMES E. FLEMING*

INTRODUCTION

Michael W. McConnell has written an elegant and illuminating article about
constitutional interpretation.' He seeks to show how five major methodological
approaches fit together. The five approaches he discusses are: "originalism,
precedent, longstanding practice, judicial restraint, and living constitutionalism
(here called the normative approach)." '2 He distinguishes two camps with
respect to these approaches. One camp, he notes, "advocates for (or against) a
particular approach ...on the assumption that these approaches are mutually
inconsistent and that the task is to determine which is best . .

. .3

The other

camp "treats the various common approaches as mere tools in the lawyerly
4
toolbox."
As against the first camp, McConnell writes: "Although I am primarily an
originalist, I have come to believe that, with the possible exception of the
normative approach, all of the five methodologies necessarily have a legitimate
place in constitutional interpretation. ' 5 Unlike the second camp, he advances
"a plausible (and ...attractive) understanding of how these methodologies
should work together, in what order, and with what priority."'6 In short, he sets
out "to prioritize the methodologies in a way that can be consistently applied in
the real work of constitutional interpretation. '7 He argues that these approaches
"should therefore be seen as a series of successive filters."'8 Thus, in
interpreting the Constitution, we should begin with originalism. If that proves
not to resolve the case at hand, we should work through the successive filters
of precedent, longstanding practice, and judicial restraint, and rarely, if ever,
come to the normative approach.
* The Honorable Paul J. Liacos Professor of Law and Associate Dean for
Intellectual
Life, Boston University School of Law. Professor McConnell's Article is a revised version
of his Annual Distinguished Lecture given at Boston University School of Law. I am
grateful to Mike DiMaio, Ashley Novak, and Sarah Schimmel for helpful comments.
IMichael W. McConnell, Time, Institutions, and Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REv.
1745 (2015).
2 Id.at 1746.

3 Id.at 1745.
4 Id.at 1746.

5 Id.
at 1786-87.
6 Id.at 1750.

7 Id.
at 1785.
8 Id.
at 1787.
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I appreciate the opportunity to offer this brief comment on McConnell's
Article. I shall make two points. One, McConnell's analysis of how the five
major approaches fit together has surprising affinities to the moral reading of
the Constitution I have defended-surprising considering that he expresses
reservations about what he understands to be the "normative approach." Two,
McConnell's discussion of the "normative approach," or moral reading, shows
that he misunderstands what a moral reading is: perhaps that is why he wishes
to exclude it as illegitimate. Contrary to McConnell, I shall argue that a moral
reading is not a particular approach that comes in, if at all, at the end of the
line. Instead, a moral reading operates all down the line, as interpreters make
moral and philosophic judgments in applying all of the sources or approaches
McConnell distinguishes, orders, and prioritizes.
In my recent book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution: For Moral
Readings and Against Originalisms,I defend what Ronald Dworkin called a

moral reading of the Constitution and what Sotirios A. Barber and I have
called a "philosophic approach" to constitutional interpretation. 9 By "moral
reading" and "philosophic approach," I refer to conceptions of the Constitution
as embodying abstract moral and political principles-not codifying concrete
historical rules or practices-and of interpretation of those principles as
requiring normative judgments about how they are best understood-not
merely historical research to discover relatively specific original meanings. I
argue that a moral reading or philosophic approach, not any version of
originalism or living constitutionalism, is the most faithful to the Constitution's
commitments. Through examining the spectacular concessions that originalists
have made to their critics, I show the extent to which we all now acknowledge
that constitutional interpretation requires normative judgments.
I.

MCCONNELL'S INCLUSIVE ORIGINALISM

In my book, I distinguish between exclusive and inclusive conceptions of
originalism. Conventional, strong originalists define it exclusively: "The only
legitimate source of constitutional interpretation is the relatively specific
original meanings and original expected applications of the founders." 10
Inclusive originalists incorporate or permit the familiar sources and
"modalities" of constitutional interpretation excluded by the strong originalists
as incompatible with originalism: for example, the very sources or approaches
that McConnell includes within legitimate constitutional interpretation. 1

9 JAMES

E.

FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION: FOR MORAL READINGS

3 (2015) (discussing SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS, at xiii, 155-70 (2007); and
AND AGAINST ORIGINALISMS
RONALD

DWORKIN,

CONSTITUTION

10Id. at 1.
II
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Thus, McConnell is an inclusive originalist, as are many other leading
originalists. Keith Whittington has taken a similar approach by recognizing
"pluralism within originalism" and acknowledging that originalist arguments
exist in an environment of "pluralism in constitutional interpretation.' 12
Likewise, Lawrence Solum has argued that originalists "can and should agree
that constitutional construction (as currently practiced) involves a plurality of
methods" or "multiple modalities."' 13 These methods or modalities, Solum
concedes, lie beyond originalism in the sense that they do not involve
14
interpretation of the original meaning of the text.
In my book, I have argued that such new, inclusive originalists share
common ground with a moral reading of the Constitution of the sort that I
defend. Moral readers like Dworkin, Barber, and me deploy a fusion of
approaches in what Solum calls "the construction zone." "Within such a
fusion, we... understand text, consensus, intentions, structures, and doctrines
not as alternatives to but as sites of philosophic reflection and choice about the
best interpretation and construction of our constitutional commitments."' 15
These inclusive originalists make spectacular concessions to the moral
reading without acknowledging or perhaps even realizing that they are doing
so. For they cannot plausibly claim that when judges and scholars find original
meaning indeterminate or inconclusive-and move on through what
McConnell conceives as the sequence of other legitimate sources or
approaches such as precedent and longstanding practice-that they are seeking
to discover and enforce the original meanings of the Constitution. Instead, they
quite plainly are making normative or pragmatic judgments about the best
understanding of our constitutional commitments and practice as we have built
them out over time. These are the very judgments that the moral readers have
insisted were necessary and that the conventional, exclusive originalists have
disparaged as illegitimate.' 6 This pluralism, even if its practitioners follow a
certain sequence or prioritizing of modalities (rather than being eclectic and
unstructured), seems to be very like the fusion of approaches that constitutes a
moral reading. Thus, without saying so, McConnell practically makes peace
with moral readings concerning the multiple sources for or approaches to
constitutional interpretation.

12 Keith E. Whittington,
ORIGINALISM:

On Pluralism within Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF

THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL

INTERPRETATION

70 (Grant Huscroft

&

Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011).
'3 Lawrence

B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in Constitutional Originalism: A

Debate 1 59-60 (Robert W. Bennett & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2011) (alluding to PHILIP C.
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) for the idea of

multiple modalities of constitutional interpretation).
"'

Id. at 60.

15 BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 9, at 190.
16 FLEMING,

supra note 9, at 36.
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MCCONNELL'S MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF A MORAL READING

This brings me to my second point: McConnell's discussion of the
"normative approach" or moral reading indicates that he does not understand
what it is. Again, he initially presents it as one of the particular approaches or
sources. In his sequencing, he presents it as the last source. He says that we
should turn to it only as a last resort, after all the other approaches or sources
have run out or proven to be indeterminate. He suggests that, even then, it may
be illegitimate. 17 1believe he says this because he is thinking of "the normative
judgment: the subjective normative
approach" as unbounded normative
8
judgment of the individual judge.'
But that is not the moral reading as Barber and I conceive it or as Dworkin
defended it. Again, the moral reading we defend is a fusion of approaches that
interpreters work through in making moral and philosophic judgments about
the best understanding of our constitutional commitments and practice. Thus,
contrary to McConnell's suggestion, the moral reading is not a specific
approach that we do not come to until the very end as a last resort. It is not a
separate and independent source that we reach only when every other source
has been exhausted.
My view, and Dworkin's view, is that interpreters are engaged in the moral
reading from the beginning to the end. They make moral and philosophic
judgments all along as they work through the fusion of approaches to
constitutional meaning. The moral reading comes into play in the very
conceptions of text, original meaning, precedent, practice, and democratic
deference that the interpreter brings to bear in constitutional interpretation.
*

When you look at the text, you face a moral and philosophic choice
concerning its very nature: Is the text a charter of abstract moral principles
or a code of detailed legal rules (and a deposit of concrete historical
practices)? 19

*

Likewise, when you seek to determine the original meaning of the text,
you face a moral or philosophic choice concerning what counts as the
original meaning: Is the relevant original meaning the abstract
concrete expectations
commitments embodied in the text or the relatively
20
in the minds of the historical framers and ratifiers?

"

In interpreting precedents and traditions, we will have to make moral and
philosophic choices concerning the nature of precedents and traditions. We
will have to decide how abstractly or concretely to conceive precedents
and traditions: Do we limit precedents to specific holdings and traditions
17McConnell, supra note 1, at 1786-87.
's Id. at 1787.
19 FLEMING, supra note 9, at 13-15.
20 Id.at 9-10.
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to the deposit of concrete historical practices, or do we build upon them
through making recourse to the basic reasons underlying precedents and
21
the abstract aspirational principles embodied in traditions?
*

Furthermore, as we proceed through common law constitutional
interpretation applying precedents from one case to the next, we will have
to make moral and philosophic choices concerning the best account of
what the line of decisions comes to. In applying precedents to new cases,
interpreters will have to decide which analogies are persuasive and which
22
are not, which will require moral and philosophic choices.

"

In deciding when to defer to democratic processes, we will have to make
moral and philosophic choices about the best understanding of the form of
democracy embodied in our constitutional practice. For example, do we
have a majoritarian democracy with simple majority rule unconstrained by
rights, a representative democracy with only procedural rights limiting
majority rule, or a constitutional democracy with substantive rights along
23
with procedural rights limiting majority rule?

And so, on my understanding of a moral reading, interpreters are making
moral and philosophic choices throughout McConnell's sequence of
approaches, not just at the end in the event that the other sources prove to be
inconclusive.
Now, it is understandable that an inclusive originalist like McConnell would
seek to avoid the eclecticism or pluralism of the toolbox approach by
proposing a priority or sequence. I am dubious about the plausibility and
desirability of such sequencing in actual judging. I am especially dubious
about whether such sequencing captures the phenomenology of actual judging,
as it is or as it should be. One might argue that I should defer to McConnell on
the plausibility of sequencing for actual judging since he was a distinguished
federal appellate court judge for seven years. But I believe that constitutional
interpretation involves more holistic, all-things-considered judgment, taking all
of the sources into account. I doubt that it does or should follow a prescribed
sequence. And I believe that the primary pull in such judgment is toward the
decision that puts our constitutional practice in its best light.
We are back to the moral reading pervading the process of making
judgments in applying the sources or approaches all down the line. This
process is not a prescribed sequence with an illegitimate "normative approach"
at the end of the line, as an illegitimate last resort to be avoided if possible.

21Id. at44.
22 Id. at 57-60.
23 BARBER

&

note 9, at 129-33; JAMES E. FLEMING,
THE CASE OF AUTONOMY 80-81 (2006).
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